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    Complete Blog Archive

    Blog: Our Tragic Flaw

    Reflections on Nonviolence 

    Monday
    Mar292010

    Genetically Modified Organisms

    This is an excerpt from Chapter 2 of Our Tragic Flaw:

    Technical innovation is the special genius of the human animal. We naturally prefer, therefore, to innovate first and ask questions later. Once the technical innovation has begun, however, we become invested in those pathways, either because of pride in the achievement itself or because of some seductive economic benefit. Especially with money on the table, we find it difficult to pause and give real consideration to the host of ethical conundrums that a new technology or process triggers. In the end, innovation almost always trumps its antitheses: the impulse to preserve simplicity, an aesthetic principle, or some spiritual value — which seem like inadequate, even silly, reasons to block the glorious march of progress.

    Genetic engineering offers a stunning example of this phenomenon in modern life. Genetic engineering is fraught with enormous risk, poses myriad ethical issues, and dangles before some of us tantalizing visions of a better (and wealthier) future. The science has already progressed far ahead of our capacity to reach any kind of consensus on the many thorny ethical questions posed by this technology. And many proprietary claims have already been staked by those who expect to realize enormous wealth from this area of technological innovation. Because so much money is involved, governments have been recruited to the cause, pouring dollars and legal resources into the biotech industry. So, as ever, the twin forces of time and money are powerfully arrayed along a vector running directly opposite the flow of thoughtful consideration, ethical reflection, and wisdom.

    The chief reasons marshaled in defense of this new field of innovation are the potential to cure disease and to feed the world. Both of these, of course, are excellent reasons to pursue knowledge. But both reasons entail unacknowledged complexities that taint their initial glow; moreover, both completely fail to address the host of issues raised by the specific configuration of technologies and their supporting infrastructure of laws, policies, and practices. In short, though the curing of disease and the feeding of the world seem like totally benign and peaceful aspirations, the logic of violence is very much at work in the politics and economics of the emerging field of genetic engineering.

    It seems entirely uncontroversial to suggest that curing disease is an unalloyed good. We can easily understand how the person who has a disease, who loves someone who does, or who may contract it someday would think it purely good to cure that disease. Certainly no one yearns wistfully for the diseases that have been cured, or at least largely contained, in the West, such as polio, tuberculosis, and so on. The medical holy grail of effectively eradicating all human disease now seems to lie within reach, as the collective genome of life on Earth is gradually mapped and examined in detail. Indeed, it seems increasingly plausible that we will eventually be able to slow the aging process dramatically, by impeding the built-in obsolescence features in the genetic structure of human cells. Thus, average human lifespan, which has already doubled in the global North over the last century (mostly by addressing infant mortality and common diseases), could eventually double again. Living well past one hundred years might soon become the norm.

    This all seems like tremendously good news. Yet, it proves problematic on a large scale over the long term. Eradicating most diseases in addition to extending the natural aging process can have only one net effect — a dramatically larger human population. From a carrying capacity perspective — a logic that is admittedly cold and merciless but nonetheless critical — a much longer-living population mathematically reduces the capacity of the planet to support our lifestyle. Thus, more people would have to share the resources of a finite planet, likely exerting a downward pressure on average consumption and standard of living. Moreover — if, as I have suggested, the Earth is already at or past its capacity to support the present population — an increase in average lifespan greatly increases the likelihood of a sharp downward spiral in the abundance of natural systems, and therefore a dramatically lower human population in the future.

    In effect, therefore, beyond some critical threshold, we gain increases in average lifespan in the short term at the direct expense of average lifespan in the future. Also, it’s likely in a world of diminishing abundance that short term gains in average lifespan among the world’s well-to-do will accrue only at the direct expense of the world’s poor. So we see that even the innocent claim that genetic engineering seeks to cure disease and slow the aging process is far more problematic than generally assumed.

    The mantra of agribusiness that it yearns to “feed the world” is similarly fraught with difficulties masked by heroic language. The counter-argument most often deployed against the “feed the world” line, that there is plenty of food in the world already and the problem lies in its distribution, has considerable merit at the moment. But as the human population reaches nine billion or more, and as the natural abundance of the global ecosystem becomes increasingly stressed and continues to degrade, this particular counterargument loses its potency. A deeper critique remains. Agribusiness proposes to address the problem of hunger with a global corporate solution that itself involves catastrophic ecological damage, not least because it entails the systematic eradication of hundreds of years of accumulated indigenous knowledge about local crops and agricultural methods. I am arguing that a corporation’s claim to feed the world is intrinsically spurious, for the world must feed itself — locally and indigenously.

    The agribusiness claim is also dishonest. The public posture of Monsanto and other agribusiness giants exudes a total disregard for public safety, the small farmer, indigenous peoples, the poor, and non-Western cultural norms. These megacorporations have made it obvious that they are playing power politics and aim to win at virtually any cost. They have worked assiduously to cut off any thoughtful discussion of the ethical dimensions of patenting genes, of legally restricting the ancient practice of saving seeds, of distributing poorly tested genetically modified materials into our soils and waterways, not to mention the global food system, or of the problematics of mechanized monoculture farming. They have successfully blocked, at least in the United States where they enjoy unfettered access to the halls of power, even the labeling of genetically modified foods in our supermarkets — as if the public has no right to know even if it wants to. Few industries, even today, rival these agribusinesses for the audacity and arrogance of their pursuit of profit. This posture does little to engender trust that they will apply any wisdom whatsoever to sensitive ethical concerns, which happen to be especially urgent in their field, or even that they will tolerate the intrusiveness of wisdom from any quarter if they can possibly prevent it.

    The doomsday scenario in genetic engineering involves the possibility that some genetic experiment might escape into the general ecosystem, or that a poorly vetted genetically modified organism might be intentionally released, which then replicates quickly and broadly with disastrous effects on the global food chain, thus threatening human survival. Millions of genetically engineered organisms are currently under development, exist in a lab somewhere, and are being examined for their properties. Despite this study, rarely can scientists predict with any accuracy what might happen if those genetic materials were to run amuck in the outside world.

    To make matters worse, we have learned that genetic pollution occurs easily in nature. Genetically modified super-plants grown in fields predictably leach their genetic superiority to neighboring weeds, which then become, of course, super-weeds. This suggests the chastening general principle that genetic materials intended for a particular purpose in the environment will likely leach out in unintended ways, with unintended effects.

    Like other doomsday scenarios already considered, it’s unlikely that a genetic disaster sufficiently serious to imperil human survival will occur. But current trends suggest that this probability will continue to increase as more and more genetically modified materials are developed and deployed in the environment, and as our understanding of genes enables us to manipulate living systems more and more powerfully. Similarly, the chances that this knowledge will be harnessed by malevolent interests also increase. Hence, I think it reasonable to suggest that the chances of this doomsday scenario, like the others we have already seen, don’t merely increase over time but accelerate.

    Some might hope that our growing knowledge will serve mainly to enhance our ability to manage genetic materials more safely. I submit, however, that a general trend of history will likely continue to hold, just as it has done over the past two centuries: advances in safety progress more slowly than advances in technological innovation. Not only does safety tend to lag well behind innovation, but lagging even further behind is something of even greater importance: ethical consensus. This unnerving trend directly indicates the presence of the logic of violence deep in the marrow of our culture.

    Like the other scenarios we have considered, perilous trends will continue to accelerate and proliferate as long as the logic of violence remains dominant in our minds and in society. While technology would undoubtedly continue to advance in a nonviolent world, I will argue that it would do so within a radically different motivational milieu, trending strongly in the direction of benefit to the many over the long term. The statistical direction of such trends would therefore consistently diminish, rather than enhance, the probability of self-induced collapse.

    Tuesday
    Mar232010

    Price Reduced on Our Tragic Flaw

    If you order directly from the publisher, you can now purchase the paperback for $17.72 (reduced from $24.95) and download the book as a PDF for $2.00 (reduced from $5.00).

    With this price reduction, this is the best possible time to purchase your very own copy.

    (Because of a technical issue on the publisher's site you may see the old price ($24.95) advertised, but when you get to the cart you should see the new price ($17.72). My apologies for the confusion!)

    Of course, you can still purchase the book from Amazon at the old price, as well.

    Saturday
    Dec262009

    Avatar's missed moral message

    Spoiler alert: Do not read this unless you have already seen Avatar, or do not plan to see it.

    With great anticipation for nothing more than a fun and fascinating romp, I saw Avatar in 3-D last night. As much as I enjoyed the visual experience--and I did enjoy it--my experience was marred by a profound sense of a missed opportunity.

    This feeling may have been inspired by the film's hit-you-over-the-head-with-a-hammer moral message: that white people destroy nature and indigenous people have learned how to live within its bounds and are all the happier for it.

    The Nav'i people were portrayed as an idealized Native American race perfectly in harmony with a breathtakingly beautiful and somewhat perilous natural world. Cameron adequately developed an idealized Native American spirituality that, he strongly suggested, we'd all do well to adopt.

    But James Cameron missed a much more significant (and timely) moral message in the second half of the film. Faced with impending extinction at the hands of the evil corporate greedmaster and the evil military grunt, and wildly out-gunned, the Nav'i adopt the ex-marine (who has been hanging about with them with decidedly mixed motives) to lead them in a violent battle to protect their territory. What ensues is ugly in the extreme but, of course, good triumphs over evil in the end...

    Except that now the Nav'i people have been ruined by their violence. (At this point, of course, I am going beyond the fairy tale into my own commentary.) The white man/Nav'i impersonator has acculturated them to the ways of warfare and much of the planet has been laid to waste.

    As long as we are writing a fairy tale, why not write something new, something adequate to our particular circumstance, one that might inspire a fresh approach to an old problem? Why rehearse the ancient and clearly flawed approach that we must meet violence with greater (or at least more cunning) violence?

    Cameron has re-enacted Custer's Last Stand, where the white man is thoroughly defeated. But we all know how that ends. It isn't hard to see how a similar fate might await the Nav'i. The corporate monolith that wants that unobtainium, and the market demand for it, hasn't gone anywhere. Surely a fresh battle awaits. How many battles before the planet is thoroughly ruined, its indigenous people totally ravaged, and the unobtainium finally obtained?

    Cameron missed a colossal opportunity to write a new ending, one driven by Nav'i spirituality which might have taught that violence only begets violence, and that there is no way to peace, only just peace. The vast neural net of all the living beings on Pandora (the unfortunately named planet of the film) might have out-thought the white invaders, not in terms of cunning in combat, but in terms of the real forces at play--as Gandhi might have called them, the moral forces at play, satyagraha.

    I invite the reader to explore for herself what fascinating ways this movie might have been brought to a peaceful and truly hopeful close. In the past twelve hours I have come up with several scenarios. Check your movie listings this time next year for Avatar 2.0...it'll blow your mind!

    Thursday
    Dec102009

    The fable of just war

    In the awkward position of accepting the Nobel Peace Prize just after announcing a catastrophic increase of commitment to the Afghanistan debacle, Obama evoked the doctrine of Just War.

    How unfortunate. Just War was developed by the Catholic Church in order to justify violence that, almost without exception, directly violates the teachings of Jesus. Since then, this doctrine has been appropriated by states to justify wars of every kind.

    The reason we are so committed to "bringing democracy" to Afghanistan/Pakistan as opposed to any number of other hotspots around the planet (including, say, much of the African continent) is the oil there. This is a war of greed, not national security--as everyone well knows.

    If Obama were truly committed to transforming energy policy, addressing global climate change, reducing terrorism, and bringing peace to the world, he would focus his energies and dollars on a green revolution in the U.S. energy sector and a transformation of the consumption patterns of U.S. consumers. Until those two objectives are met--as a minimum--the U.S. will forever be involved in Unjust War.

    Tuesday
    Dec012009

    This post is not really about sex

    I just read with fascination an article from Sunday's New York Times Magazine entitled, "Women Who Want to Want." The article profiles Lori Brotto of the British Columbia Center for Sexual Medicine in Vancouver, who leads a panel that will define what is currently called Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder (HSDD) for the upcoming new version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V) to be released by the American Psychiatric Association in 2012 or 2013.

    The DSM tries to be the definitive diagnostic tool for any kind of mental health problem. Perhaps more importantly, health insurers will not cover mental health services that are not coded according to DSM criteria. As a result, every clinician who accepts insurance must interact with the DSM whether they agree with its criteria or underlying philosophy or not.

    The research agenda that undergirds the DSM assumes that all mental health disorders have a distinct biolgical basis, and distinct and unique symptomatic traces. Part of the process of identifying specific disorders involves a normative evaluation of collections of symptoms. When certain collections of symptoms appear with some measurable frequency, researchers assume they have identified a specific disorder.

    All of the disorders within DSM are defined as involving clinically significant "distress or impairment" of the individual, and/or, in some cases, others. (For example, individuals with antisocial personality disorder rarely feel distressed or impaired, but those off of whom they prey often do.)

    All of the DSM's criteria are ultimately normative: that is, what is considered abnormal distress or abnormal impairment defines a disorder--there is no absolutely objective scale.

    If it were not for the enormous investment of research energies, dollars, and infrastructure that supports the ongoing institution of the DSM, I think it would be perfectly clear to all that its research agenda has failed miserably. The definition of disorder in general has come under repeated attack for all sorts of good reasons; whole sections of the DSM are questionable and quite controversial (not least of which are the sexual disorders discussed in the aforementioned magazine article); and all the disorders are beset by staggering patterns of comorbidity (which means multiple diagnoses in the same person).

    One can catch of glimpse of these difficulties from this short passage from the cited article:

    One criterion Brotto advocates adding is a dim or missing sense of excitement during sex itself. This is one of her ways of including Basson’s thinking — that desire often arises during, not before. But it leads to a troubling question. What if the lack of excitement is due to a partner’s ineptitude? What if it’s caused by a lover’s emotional disconnection? Suddenly the realm of mental disorder, which is supposed to be delineated, as the introduction to the D.S.M. puts it, by “dysfunction in the individual,” is being distorted by the role of others. Is it the patient who has the condition, or the partner, or the couple? In building on Basson’s “responsive desire,” Brotto’s criteria run repeatedly into this fundamental problem. A partner’s involvement is more or less inescapable.

    Brotto stares squarely at this conundrum, knowing, she told me, that it can’t be resolved, knowing that the best she can do is acknowledge it in some sort of introductory passage and continue on the path she thinks right. Meanwhile, the usual waning of erotic urgency over the course of long relationships, a decline that, according to many clinicians and one study, may beset women more steeply than men, could mean that proposed criteria like “absent/reduced sexual excitement/pleasure during sexual activity” are met by nearly everyone — another muddle of diagnostic logic. To address this problem, the disorder’s current language encouraging clinicians to take the context of their patients’ lives into account may need more emphasis in the D.S.M.-V.

    Brotto knows too that there are sexologists who maintain that desire by any definition — whether the sheer lust Basson minimizes or the responsive variety she trumpets — is almost entirely a cultural invention rather than a biological reality; that it has been made to seem essential by the sex scenes in movies and the advice columns in magazines; and that it is best deleted from the D.S.M. Leonore Tiefer, a professor in the psychiatry department at New York University and the author of a collection of essays titled “Sex Is Not a Natural Act,” argues that the contrivance is compounded by the pharmaceutical industry, which offers research money to sexologists who find ways, no matter if unconsciously, to inflate hugely the numbers of women suffering from an already-fictive condition — a disorder that the drug companies intend to cure. High numbers help to increase awareness, which stokes demand. To what extent this theory represents truth, as opposed to being merely plausible, is hard to sort out. When I spoke recently with officials at Boehringer-Ingelheim, which just announced the auspicious, if not overwhelming, results of large-scale trials of its desire-enhancing medication, Flibanserin, the officials were careful to cite only conservative figures on the women who might want such a pill. (Though the exact mechanisms of the drug are unclear, it seems to act on the brain’s serotonin and dopamine receptors.) Brotto, like all the specialists in all areas working on the new D.S.M., is allowed to receive no more than $10,000 per year from any source connected to the pharmaceutical industry. This is an A.P.A. rule. But Tiefer’s is hardly the only voice warning that, despite A.P.A. protections, drug-company influence can shape, indirectly as well as directly, the decisions of D.S.M. panelists.

    Brotto is surrounded by skepticism. And she herself told me that it might take till the publication of the D.S.M.-VI, probably two decades from now, for science to establish sound norms for women’s desire.

    In fact, Brotto may be far too optimistic in this estimate. So far, no clear biological basis has been found for any mental health disorder whatsoever.

    The real issue here is that the DSM lacks a coherent and articulated philosophical basis. No amount of science can save it; indeed, such science can only further expose the DSM's deficiencies. In this blog post I can hardly clear things up very much: such would be (may be) the task of a second book. But I would like to float two extremely important components of what could prove a more coherent approach.

    The first involves making a clear distinction between medical and psychological realms of concern. Modern psychology, after all, was begun by a medical doctor, Freud, who clearly regarded mental health as a medical domain. Most of the subsequent course of the field has been in the hands of psychiatrists, also medical doctors. It's no coincidence that the DSM is published by the American Psychiatric Association.

    I believe this has all been an enormous and disastrous philosophical mistake. The field as a whole (though certainly not all of its participants) continues to conflate medical and psychological concerns. I would propose, instead, that we have in fact two distinct fields of interest here that overlap, to be sure, but must be regarded distinctly.

    In this post I can only suggest the distinction (I will try at some later date to flesh it out adequately), but hopefully it will be enough to give you a sense of where I am going with this. The domain of the psyche (which in the original Greek means soul) involves the mind; the domain of medicine involves the body (including its most complex organ, the brain). I am not a dualist; I know perfectly well that the mind is a function of the body. But I believe that psychological issues arise in the experience of the person and reflect the experience of the person in ways that are certainly represented in the biochemistry of the brain, and are causally dependent upon the brain, but that are most directly approached through experience, not biology. (For a fuller, but quite accessible, philosophical discussion of this orientation toward the mind/body problem, see John Searle's Mind: A Brief Introduction.)

    Among the DSM's disorders we may construct a spectrum from the medical to the psychological. On the medical extreme we find conditions that may be defined entirely by biological factors, such as Down syndrome, which can be attributed wholly to a chromosomal anomaly. On the psychological extreme we may find conditions that are defined entirely by experiential factors, such as Post Traumatic Stress disorder.

    Now, let us be clear: a person with Downs will likely experience unique difficulties as a result of his chromosomal irregularity, and these would count as psychological difficulties; and a person with PTSD likely has some kind of biological pre-disposition toward a disabling response to stress. So, the biological and psychological intermingle complexly--probably in every case. But the relevant question concerns treatment: at one end of the spectrum a medical treatment (if any be available) is indicated; at the other, a psychological treatment. Medicine intervenes in the biological function of the person. Psychological therapy intervenes in the experience of the person. Medicine treats the body; psychotherapy treats the mind.

    As we move toward the middle of the spectrum, a mixture of approaches may be indicated: some medical treatment in addition to psychotherapy. In fact, it may be that most conditions referenced by the DSM call for such a mixture. Even so, it behooves us, I think, to remain clear on the extent and limits of each treatment modality.

    Secondly, now that we can set to one side the medical aspects of various mental health conditions, a close reading of the DSM suggests that there is, in fact, only one properly psychological diagnosis. Further, a philosophical interpretation of the DSM leads one to the very same conclusion. I will begin with the philosophical argument.

    Every diagnosis in the DSM makes some reference to clinically significant "distress or impairment." In most cases, these concerns are initiated and reported by the complainant. To be clear: in order to be diagnosed for the vast majority of DSM disorders, a person must report severe distress or impairment. (The exceptions involve a minority of cases, like antisocial personality disorder, where the patient is unaware of, or unconcerned with, such matters.) Any number of factors may contribute to a person's distress, and a sense of being impaired is one of them. Impairment, then, is privileged by the DSM as a special case of distress.

    Cynically, one can see the rationale for the privilege of impairment. If a person is missing work, or unable to attend to family obligations, that is a kind of impairment that is recognized by our culture as requiring treatment. Implicit in impairment is a plea to insurance companies to provide relief for a major disability that affects the person's productivity in society. Simultaneously, and along similar lines, severe distress implies impairment: that is, a person who is severely distressed will (by definition?) be impaired in her ability to function productively. Here we see the ominous undercarriage of the whole (mental) health system, as a means to re-instate economic units into active production.

    The experience of distress, including the particular case of distress about being impaired, is called anxiety. Accordingly, all conditions referenced in the DSM are definitionally anxiety conditions (with the possible exception of conditions where distress or impairment are reported by third parties). So goes, in brief, the philosophical argument for anxiety as the one over-arching psychological concern.

    A close reading of the DSM, and particularly the pattern of comorbidity that has been established among DSM diagnoses, supports the notion that all psychological concerns are rooted in anxiety. Depression and anxiety are closely linked, suggesting a theory that anxiety expresses itself in two contrasting forms: hyper-arousal (such as panic, or manic phases), and hypo-arousal (such as major depression, or dissociation).

    Without fleshing out this theory any further, allow me to suggest how this approach might grossly simplify the research project of Ms. Brotto who, as you remember, was concerned particularly with female hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD). She uses mindfulness techniques to work with "undersexed" women, with some success--which makes sense if what she is dealing with is essentially an anxiety issue. The patriarchal problem here--the cultural assumption that women should be sexually active and available to their (presumably) male partners throughout all phases of adult life--poses no difficulty if we see a person's anxious concern as being, in part, about reconciling her sexual rhythms with cultural expectations. Brotto has a fundamental problem at least in part because low libido is culturally forbidden, and yet this has nothing to do with science or biology. Nevertheless, it produces an experience of anxiety that psychotherapy can fruitfully address.

    So, now in microcosm, we can see the rub. If a woman seeks therapy because of anxiety about a low libido, insurers will not cover her without some biological argument, and a concrete "impairment." So, well-intentioned researchers such as Brotto spend a career trying to ferret out such a rationale. Undoubtedly, this frenzy of research will find nuggets of truth that we might not have discovered otherwise. But, at the same time, it works to obscure an obvious and painful truth that keeps people--in this case women--in a kind of anxious prison in which they are either defined as "disordered" or their complaints are seen as trivial and their treatment indulgent.

    The obvious and painful truth to which I refer is this: in some cases--and perhaps in many--psychological distress is a function of a disordered society. If my analysis is anywhere near the truth, we can begin to see that the DSM itself is what is "disordered," and that many of the people it has put into its various pigeon-holes are made anxious, at least in part, by the conundrum of how to live joyfully in a profoundly dysfunctional world.